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How Courts Do — And Don’t —
Respond to Statutory Overrides
BY DEBORAH A. WIDISS*

C

ourts and Congress are, at
times, engaged in a kind of
ongoing “conversation” about
statutory law. Congress has
exclusive power to enact statutes — but when statutory language is
unclear, or doesn’t explicitly resolve
a factual question that arises under a
statute, courts must resolve the issue
through
statutory
interpretation.
Congress then may choose to “override”1 judicial interpretations with
which it disagrees (so long as the judicial decision is not constitutional in
nature) by amending the law at issue
or enacting a new law. The power to
enact such overrides is core to maintaining democratic accountability for
policy. Enactment of an override, however, is not the end of the story. As
new cases arise, courts must assess
how the new statutory language has
changed the prior legal landscape. And
so the exchange continues.
Earlier commentators, including
many well-respected judges, have
offered thoughtful suggestions for
facilitating
communication
from
courts to Congress about problems in

How effective is
communication
from Congress
back to courts?
The answer is:
Not very.
statutes that Congress might want to
address.2 My research explores the
opposite question. How effective is
communication from Congress back
to courts? The answer is: Not very.3
Even when Congress enacts overrides,
courts frequently continue to follow
the prior judicial precedent. This is
likely due more to information failure
than willful disregard of controlling
law. Nonetheless, a key aspect of the
separation of powers is broken.
My research shows that when the
Supreme Court overrules a prior decision, lower courts quickly decrease

their reliance on the old precedent and
begin to apply the new rule. By contrast,
when Congress enacts an override,
citation patterns to the prior precedent change very little. Even a decade
later, many overridden precedents, or
what I have called “shadow precedents,”
are still routinely cited as controlling
precedent.
This surprising finding may be
partially explained by the coding protocols used by leading legal research
services. When assessing the viability of precedent, both Westlaw and
Lexis consider primarily judicial signals rather than legislative signals;
accordingly, it can take several years
before a decision is “flagged” as having
been affected by later legislation. Even
when aware of an override, legal actors
sometimes fail to follow the new statutory standard. Luckily, this problem
is easy to address. Courts need to
start their research with the statutory
language itself, rather than a judicial gloss on the statutory language.
Sometimes there are difficult interpretive questions regarding the scope of
an override, but often it’s just a mat-
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ter of carefully considering whether
the operative language supersedes
any aspect of a prior interpretation. By
taking this straightforward approach,
courts can help ensure that overrides
can play their expected role in our
tri-partite system of government.

Courts Often Rely on
Overridden Precedents
Congressional overrides are typically
described as the legislative equivalent of a judicial overruling. My study
with Professor Brian Broughman was
the first to empirically test this characterization. We constructed a database
of Supreme Court decisions that had
been overruled by later Supreme Court
decisions; Supreme Court decisions
that had been overridden by later statutory amendments; and a “control”
group of Supreme Court decisions
that were similar (in terms of subject
matter, year of decision, and other
factors) to the overruled and overridden decisions but that had not been
repudiated by subsequent judicial or
legislative actions.4 We then used
Lexis’s Shepard’s service to assess how
often each Supreme Court case in our
database was cited by other courts,
generally looking at a 15-year window
that spanned from five years prior to

the superseding “event” — either overruling or overriding — to ten years
after it.5 Although citation counts are
admittedly a somewhat blunt measure, they are frequently used in legal
and political science studies as a rough
gauge of the ongoing precedential
weight of a prior decision. By collecting citation data from several years
before the superseding event, we were
able to establish a “baseline” citation
pattern, which we could then compare
to citation levels after the overruling
or the override. We hypothesized that
citation patterns could be expected to
change in two different ways: “positive” or “neutral” citations would be
expected to decline, and “negative”
citations, such as an indication that the
prior decision had been fully or partially overruled or superseded, would
be expected to increase. To capture
both of these effects, we developed
a measure we called “net citations,”
which we defined as the number of positive or neutral citations to a decision,
minus the number of warning or other
negative citations.6 We then compared
the average number of net citations a
case received each year after the event
to the average number of net citations
the case received before the event; this
ratio measures how much effect the

FIGURE 1. MEDIAN CITATION RATIOS BY TREATMENT GROUP*
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*This figure is reproduced from Broughman & Widiss, After the
Override, supra note 3, at 68. “Citation ratio” is defined as net
citation in year t divided by average net citations per year in the
pre-event period.

overruling or override had on citation
levels.
Our findings were striking. As shown
in Figure 1 below, after a judicial overruling, net citations to the prior decision
drop rapidly when compared to the preevent baseline. The citation patterns
for cases in our “overridden” category,
by contrast, are very similar to those of
our control group. Overall levels of citations drop, but in a gradual fashion that
is typical of the natural “depreciation”
that decisions generally experience
over time.7
Even ten years after an override is
enacted, most overridden precedents
are still widely cited as controlling
precedent.
Degree of Overruling or Override. We
recognize that an override may supersede some, but not all, of the analysis in
a prior decision, meaning other aspects
of the decision remain controlling.
The same, of course, is true for a judicial overruling. To assess whether this
affected our results, the cases were
assigned a “depth” measure that evaluated how completely the overruling
Supreme Court decision or overriding
legislation rejected the prior opinion,8
as well as an “explicitness” measure
that evaluated how explicit the Court
or Congress was about its disapproval
of the prior opinion. We found that
for both sets of cases, greater “depth”
was associated with a larger decline
in citations; however, at each level of
“depth,” citations to overruled cases
declined more dramatically than citations to the overridden cases. The
same was true for “explicitness.” Thus,
our findings are not the result of comparing deep and explicit overrulings
to shallow and non-explicit overrides. Rather, even when we control
for these factors, we find that judicial
overrulings have considerably more
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effect on future citations than legislative overrides.
As an additional robustness check,
for a randomly selected subset of cases
in both groups, we hand-coded individual headnotes to distinguish between
headnotes identifying portions of the
prior decision that had been superseded and those that had not. Since
Lexis’s Shepard’s service tracks citations to each headnote in a case, this
allowed us to assess in a more finegrained manner which propositions
within each case were being referenced
when later decisions cited to the earlier
precedents. For both groups of cases,
we found a notable decline in net citations to the headnotes associated with
specific propositions within the cases
that had been superseded, but again
this decrease was much more pronounced for the overruled cases than
the overridden cases. Additionally, we
assessed the extent to which ideological preferences might explain ongoing
citation of overridden precedents, but
our data did not suggest a judge’s ideology was the driving factor.9
Prospectivity. Because a judicial overruling is a reinterpretation of existing law,
it typically takes effect immediately; the
Court’s new interpretation will apply to
all pending disputes, including those
arising out of events that pre-dated
the new opinion. By contrast, statutory
overrides are typically prospective; the
old (now superseded) judicial standard
will govern the resolution of a dispute
arising out of events that pre-date the
effective date of the statutory amendment, even if the decision in the case
is issued after the effective date of the
amendment. For this reason, we would
expect to see a judicial overruling have
a more immediate effect on net citation levels than a statutory override. To
address this issue, our analysis excluded
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Even ten years
after an override
is enacted, most
overridden
precedents are
still widely cited
as controlling
precedent.
citation counts from the year of the
superseding event and the first two
years after the superseding event, as
this is the window when we expect the
difference between retroactive judicial
overrulings and prospective statutory
overrides to be most salient. We modified these parameters to exclude greater
and fewer years, but our general results
held, suggesting that the differences we
observe are not driven by the prospective nature of overrides.10
****

Since this study relies on citation
counts, rather than a close reading of
the context for each citation, we cannot
definitively assert that any particular
citation of an overridden case was in
error. Below, I provide specific examples, drawn from my work on overrides
in the employment discrimination context, of both “proper” and “improper”
citations to overridden cases. The big
picture conclusion is clear, however. If
overrides were having the effect that
they are intended to have, it is reasonable to assume that there would be
sizeable decline in citations to legislatively overridden precedents, just as
there is a sizeable decline in citations
to judicially overruled precedents.

Instead, on average, citation patterns
to the overridden cases are almost
indistinguishable from those to the
comparison control group of cases that
have been neither overridden nor overruled. This suggests that often courts
fail to hear — or to heed — Congress’s
side of the dialogue.

Westlaw and Lexis Coding
Protocols Often Fail to Flag that a
Precedent Has Been Overridden
Judicial overrulings may be more effective than legislative overrides in part
because the coding protocols used by
leading legal research services, such
as Westlaw’s KeyCite system and
Lexis’s Shepard’s system, are far better at identifying the former than the
latter. The services’ coding protocols
rely almost exclusively on judicial signals rather than legislative signals.11
This approach reflects the common
law roots of American law; the coding
protocols are based on the assumption
that only a subsequent judicial decision
will affect the precedential weight of
a prior judicial decision. Under these
protocols, when the Supreme Court
overrules a prior precedent, coders
will generally add a “red-flag” or a
“warning” signal to the prior precedent immediately. By contrast, coders
are generally not expected to assess
whether legislative actions affect the
precedential value of judicial decisions;
an overridden precedent typically will
not be flagged unless or until a court
asserts in a decision that new statutory
language has superseded a prior judicial interpretation. After a court has
made such a declaration, coders should
add a cautionary or warning signal to
the prior decision. However, Westlaw
will only red-flag a decision if a court
at the same or a higher level in the
judicial hierarchy indicates a change
in the precedential value of the case.

u
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This means that Supreme Court cases
that have been overridden will only be
red-flagged on Westlaw if the Supreme
Court itself explicitly indicates that the
prior decision has been superseded by
the subsequent legislation.12
This can result in surprisingly long
lag times — on average, more than
four years (!) — before a legislatively
overridden precedent is flagged at all,
and only about 20 percent of overridden Supreme Court decisions are
red-flagged on Westlaw.13 That said,
this average masks significant differences. A leading study distinguishes
between overrides that explicitly
denounce prior judicial interpretations
as incorrect, what the study terms
“restorative” overrides, and overrides designed to update or clarify a
statute, often in response to a judicial
invitation to do so.14 Many precedents
superseded by restorative overrides
are flagged within a few months. By
contrast, it often takes several years
before precedents that are affected by
an updating or clarifying override are
flagged; some may never be flagged.
This may be because updating or clarifying overrides receive less attention
from popular and legal media. They are
also often part of larger overhauls of
statutory law, such as a major reform
of bankruptcy or tax law, rather than
standalone bills that are clearly responsive to prior Supreme Court decisions.
The irony is that courts often explicitly
invite Congress to enact updating or
clarifying overrides, on the theory that
new policy should come from the legislature rather than the judiciary — but
even if Congress does so, the old precedents may continue to hold sway.
My work in this area has focused on
congressional overrides of Supreme
Court decisions. However, Congress
also frequently supersedes lower court
decisions, sometimes resolving a circuit
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I found several
cases in which
the flawed
reasoning of one
court was cited
and followed by
other courts.
In other words,
once a court
has incorrectly
characterized
the scope of an
override, it can
be difficult to
stamp out.
split or an area of confusion before the
Supreme Court weighs in.15 While my
research did not look at this directly, it
is likely that there may be even longer
delays before such lower court decisions are flagged as superseded.

Courts Often Struggle to
Recognize and Interpret
Congressional Signals
in Overrides
My empirical study with Professor
Broughman shows that citations to
overruled precedents decline quickly,
but citations to overridden precedents,
on average, do not. This suggests that
overrides do not have as much impact
as they should. In part, this is likely
due to the Westlaw and Lexis coding
protocols discussed above. But even

when aware that an override has been
enacted, lower courts must assess the
extent to which the new statutory language supersedes the prior judicial
interpretation. This is often straightforward; it simply requires that courts
carefully apply the standard in the
revised legislation. But in some cases, it
can be difficult to determine the scope
of the override. I have conducted case
studies of employment discrimination
overrides that illustrate some of the
issues that can arise.
Mistakes in Applying New Statutory
Language. The ADA Amendments Act

of 2008 (ADAAA) explicitly repudiated
prior Supreme Court decisions that had
interpreted the meaning of “disability”
in the Americans with Disabilities Act
very stringently.16 The ADAAA’s stated
purpose was to “reinstat[e] a broad
scope of protection” under the ADA.17
It passed with high levels of bipartisan
support and was signed by President
George W. Bush. Several years after it
was enacted, I assessed the degree to
which courts were appropriately following the new statutory standards.18
I found that, with some regularity,
courts continued to apply the overridden cases for propositions that were
unquestionably superseded by the
new statute.19
The mistakes fell into two categories. First, there were decisions that
failed to mention the ADAAA at all,
even though the events giving rise to
the dispute occurred after the effective date of the ADAAA.20 These cases
simply applied the prior precedent as
if the ADAAA had never been enacted.
Second, there were many decisions in
which courts observed (correctly) that
the ADAAA had superseded the preADAAA precedent in some respects
but then asserted (incorrectly) that the
relevant portion of such precedent still
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applied, even in contexts where the
judicial interpretations at issue were
clearly and indisputably incompatible with the new statutory language.
Courts also sometimes observed (correctly) that the ADAAA had superseded
pre-ADAAA Supreme Court precedent,
but then followed circuit court precedent based on the superseded Supreme
Court precedent, without acknowledging that the circuit precedent should
also be reconsidered in light of the
new statutory language. For example,
numerous lower courts applied prior
Supreme Court and circuit court precedent concerning what was necessary to
establish that a plaintiff was “regarded
as” having a disability, even though the
amended statute established a new, far
more flexible standard for “regarded
as” claims.21
Our adversarial system depends
primarily on lawyers to identify the
relevant law and make arguments that
will benefit their clients. I assume that
in many of these cases, the lawyers
failed to properly use the new statutory standard in their briefs. However,
even if lawyers make such mistakes,
judges have an independent responsibility to apply the governing statutory
law.22 Additionally, sometimes the
party who would have benefited from
the new language was pro se, making
it even more imperative that judges
research the applicable law carefully.
In many instances, the legal mistake
may not have affected the outcome of
the specific case, as there may have
been independent grounds that justified the ultimate decision. However,
the error is still problematic. I found
several cases in which the flawed reasoning of one court was cited and
followed by other courts. In other
words, once a court has incorrectly
characterized the scope of an override,
it can be difficult to stamp out.
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Moreover, the ADAAA was an unusually direct override that received
significant attention in both the popular media and the legal press. Indeed,
in terms of absolute numbers, citations
to the precedents overridden by the
ADAAA dropped quickly and dramatically.23 The prevalence of mistakes even
in this high-profile context suggests
that mistakes likely make up a large
portion of ongoing citations to overridden precedents in general, since most
overrides are not as clear or prominent
as was the ADAAA.
Interpretative Complexity
Arises in Implementing

Sometimes
Overrides.

I have also explored situations in which
judges could reasonably disagree about
whether the override statute or the
pre-existing precedent should apply.
One common question is whether the
statutory language fully repudiates the
reasoning, as well as the result, of a prior
decision. For example, in 1978, Congress
overrode a Supreme Court decision that
had held that pregnancy discrimination
was not a form of sex discrimination.24
Lower courts have since disagreed
about how to resolve cases involving
similar issues, such as discrimination on
the basis of breastfeeding or contraceptive access. Some courts have concluded
that Congress implicitly adopted the
reasoning of the dissenting justices in
the original case, whereas other courts
suggest that the majority’s reasoning
continues to control resolution of these
related matters.25
It may also be unclear how an override should be interpreted when
Congress amends one statute to supersede a judicial interpretation but does
not make comparable amendments
in other statutes that are typically
interpreted in pari materia. For example, in 1991, Congress amended Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act to partially

codify and partially override a judicially-crafted causation standard.
Congress did not amend other employment discrimination statutes, but the
House Judiciary Committee stated in a
report that it expected these statutes
would be interpreted “consistently”
with the standard in the override.26
When deciding cases brought under
other discrimination statutes after the
1991 amendments, some lower courts
applied the causation standard in the
override, and others applied the prior
precedent.27 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court rejected both these standards,
announcing a different standard that
it held applied to the private-sector
provisions of the age discrimination
statute, and, in a subsequent case, Title
VII’s retaliation provisions.28 Courts at
all levels continue to grapple with how
the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions apply to other federal statutes.29
As this article was being finalized for
publication, the Supreme Court was
actively considering two more cases
that arise from this series of events.30
Courts must also determine what
causation standard applies to state
laws modeled on these federal laws,
a question made particularly difficult
by the fact that many state statutes
address age along with traits covered
by Title VII.31 Similar questions arise
even when Congress agrees with a
judicial interpretation, if it codifies that
interpretation in the statute but does
not make comparable changes in other
statutes with similar language.32
In my earlier work, I argue that relying on overridden precedents in these
kinds of situations can undermine
interests usually served by following
precedent, such as fairness, efficiency,
and predictability. Such reliance can
also thwart congressional intent. In the
causation cases discussed above, the
Supreme Court has suggested that if, in
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1991, when Congress amended Title VII
to supersede the Court’s prior interpretation of Title VII, Congress wanted
its preferred causation standard to
apply more generally, it should have
simultaneously amended all other antidiscrimination statutes with language
similar to that in Title VII. The Court
then characterized Congress’s failure to do so as an affirmative “choice”
by Congress that a different standard
should apply.33 I have argued that this
conjecture does not reasonably reflect
the institutional realities within which
Congress operates. As an alternative,
I have suggested interpretive conventions that I believe would allay
confusion about the scope of overrides
and better accord with likely congressional intent. Specifically, I argue that
enactment of an override should create rebuttable presumptions that (1)
both the reasoning and result of the
prior interpretation is superseded; and
(2) similar language in other statutes
should be interpreted in accordance
with the override, so long as that application is a reasonable interpretation of
the pre-existing statutory language.34
A full explication of these proposals is beyond the scope of this article.
Here, I simply highlight that there are
sometimes complicated interpretative questions implicit in interpreting
overrides. This may be at least a partial
explanation for why overrides have
less effect on subsequent citation patterns than overrulings. To address this
problem, Congress or the Supreme
Court should provide greater clarity
about how lower courts should resolve
these kinds of questions.

Judges — and Other Legal
Actors — Can Make
Overrides Work Better
Overrides are not self-implementing.
They are only effective if other legal
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Judges can
mitigate this
problem simply
by stating
explicitly in
their decisions
that a statutory
amendment
supersedes
or partially
supersedes a
prior precedent.
actors properly apply the new statutory standard, rather than the prior
judicial precedent. As this article has
shown, that process often breaks down.
Luckily, there are some ready fixes.
Start with the Statute. When doing
legal research in a statutory case, lawyers and courts should always begin
their analysis with the statute itself.
If judicial precedents interpreting the
statute predate any statutory amendments, the current operative statutory
language should be carefully assessed
to determine whether and to what
extent it supersedes the prior judicial
analysis. It may be helpful to consult
the “finding and purposes” sections for
the statute, as Congress may identify
particular judicial decisions that have
motivated statutory changes.35 Such
preambles may not be codified adjacent to the substantive provision, or

they may not be codified at all, but they
can easily be found in the public law.
Committee reports and other reliable
legislative history can also provide
helpful context.
Explicitly Recognize Overrides in
Opinions. As discussed above, the cod-

ing protocols used by Westlaw and
Lexis rely almost exclusively on courts
to assess the precedential weight of
prior decisions. This means there
can be a multi-year delay before an
overridden precedent is flagged as
superseded, and some overridden
precedents are never flagged. Judges
can mitigate this problem simply by
stating explicitly in their decisions that
a statutory amendment supersedes or
partially supersedes a prior precedent.
Such statements should result in the
earlier decision being flagged, even if
the court ultimately determines it is
appropriate to rely on the overridden
precedent in resolving the particular
question at hand. In subsequent disputes, lawyers and courts will then be
more likely to assess properly whether
the new statutory language affects the
application of the prior precedent.
Identify Overridden Precedents in
Statutory Language. Congress should

also take steps to improve the efficacy
of overrides. Congress often provides explanations for why a statute
is being amended, including approval
or disapproval of judicial decisions,
in committee reports.36 When possible, comparable statements should
be included in the statute itself. This
should facilitate more prompt flagging by legal research services.37
Additionally, this would likely be more
effective in informing statutory interpretation, as there are some judges
who categorically refuse to consider
legislative history. However, large-
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scale revisions of substantive law
often implicate numerous Supreme
Court and lower court decisions; it
could be quite unwieldy (and counter
to existing drafting norms) to mention
all relevant decisions in the statutory
text. Accordingly, Congress’s failure to
identify a precedent as impacted by a
new law should not be interpreted as a
signal that the prior precedent remains
controlling.38 If the substantive statutory language does not accord with the
interpretation in a prior judicial opinion, the statutory language controls,
whether or not the statute mentions
the prior decision.
Clarify Effect on Related Statutes. When
enacting an override, Congress should
also consider whether there are other
statutes that are typically interpreted
in pari materia and, if so, whether it
intends to have the override apply to
these other statutes. Where practicable, such as where there is a clearly
defined and limited number of statutes
with similar language, Congress could
make changes to all such statutes.39 In
some instances, it might be extremely
difficult to identify and amend all
1

2

3

I use the term “override,” rather than “overrule,”
purposefully. Congress, of course, does not have
the power to “overrule” a court — only a court
can do so. But Congress can enact new statutory
language that effectively nullifies or supersedes
a court’s conclusion or interpretation, which I
refer to as an act of overriding. Overruling, by
contrast, carries its regular meaning: a judicial
decision by a court at the same or a higher level
in the judicial hierarchy that rejects or sets aside
a prior judicial decision.
See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes
94–102 (2014); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert
L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps For Legislators
and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 Minn.
L. Rev. 1045, 1059–81 (1991); Wilfred Feinberg, A
National Court of Appeals?, 42 Brook. L. Rev.
611, 627 (1976); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W.
Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 Harv. L.
Rev. 1417, 1429–32 (1987).
This article highlights findings from several
more extensive studies I have conducted. See
Brian J. Broughman & Deborah A. Widiss, After
the Override: An Empirical Analysis of Shadow
Precedent, 46 J. Leg. Studs. 51 (2017) [hereinafter
After the Override]; Deborah A. Widiss, Still
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other statutes with similar language.40
Nonetheless, Congress should at least
make statements in “findings and purposes” clauses that indicate its intent
as to the scope and application of an
override. (These same approaches also
apply when Congress agrees with or
essentially codifies a judicial interpretation.) I have also argued the Supreme
Court should reconsider the inferences
it draws from congressional “silence”
in this context to better reflect the
realities of congressional process.41

to ensure that statutory research
properly assesses the significance of
legislative change, and by recognizing that there may be significant lag
time before legal research services
flag earlier decisions as having been
superseded, courts and lawyers can
play a key role in making overrides
more effective. This will protect and
promote core principles of democratic
accountability built into the structure
of our government.

DEBORAH A. WIDISS
is Professor of Law,
Associate Dean for
Research and Faculty
Affairs, and Ira C.
Batman Faculty Fellow
at the Indiana University
Maurer School of Law. She thanks Brian
Broughman, Charlie Geyh, Abbe Gluck, and
Judge David Hamilton for comments on early
drafts of this article, and Rachel Pawlak for
research assistance. This article summarizes
research Widiss has conducted over the past
decade, and she thanks the many colleagues,
anonymous reviewers, editors, and students
who assisted with research and provided
suggestions to improve those earlier projects.

Improve Legal Research Functionality.

Finally, Westlaw and Lexis should consider making changes to their coding
protocols to identify overridden precedents more clearly and more quickly.
The Congressional Research Service,
the Legislative Counsel’s office, or
other relevant agencies also could
compile lists of overrides. Any and all
of these reforms can help overrides
better achieve their intended effect.

Conclusion
My research in this area boils down
to a simple point: Overrides often fail
to actually override. By taking steps

4

5

Kickin’ After All These Years: Sutton and Toyota
As Shadow Precedents, 63 Drake L. Rev. 919 (2015)
[hereinafter Still Kickin’]; Deborah A. Widiss,
Identifying Congressional Overrides Should Not Be
This Hard, 92 Tex. L. Rev. See Also 145 (2014) [hereinafter Identifying Overrides]; Deborah A. Widiss,
Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra
Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 Tex. L. Rev.
859 (2012) [hereinafter Hydra Problem]; Deborah
A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation
of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 511 (2009)
[hereinafter Shadow Precedents].
The dataset included cases subject to override
or overruling between 1985 and 2011. Overridden cases were identified by Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional
Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretations, 1967–2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1317 (2014);
overruled cases were identified by the Supreme
Court Database, http://scdb.wustl.edu. For more
detail on how our dataset was constructed, see
Broughman & Widiss, After the Override, supra
note 3, at 61–62 and Appendix.
See Broughman & Widiss, After the Override,
supra note 3, at 62–63, 83–86 (discussing rea-

6

7

8

9
10
11

12

sons for our use of unbalanced panel data and
robustness checks we used to assess whether it
was impacting our results).
Specifically, using Shepard’s indicators, “net
citation” is defined as (citations coded by
Shepard’s as “positive” + “neutral” + “cited by”
citations) – (citations coded by Shepard’s as
“warning” + “caution” + “questioned” citations).
See Broughman & Widiss, After the Override, supra note 3, at 68–70; see also, e.g., Ryan C. Black &
James F. Spriggs II, The Citation and Depreciation
of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 10 J. Empirical
Legal Stud. 325 (2013); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & Econ. 249 (1976).
See Broughman & Widiss, After the Override,
supra note 3, at 66 and Appendix (discussing the
depth measurements used).
See id. at 86–87.
See id. at 82–83.
See Widiss, Identifying Overrides, supra note 3,
at 159–62 (discussing the coding protocols in
more detail). In 2019, I confirmed that the coding
protocols remain substantially unchanged.
u
According to Westlaw’s protocols, decisions
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should also be red-flagged immediately if the
statutory language specifically disapproves of a
decision by name; however, I found Westlaw did
not always follow this protocol. See id. at 161 n. 83.
13
See id. at 155–61. In 2019, I confirmed that it
remains true that only about 20 percent of the
overridden cases are red-flagged on Westlaw;
the delay in initial flagging may have decreased
as electronic resources have improved. Cf. id.
at 157 (noting average delay was shorter for
overrides enacted after 1987 than for overrides
enacted earlier).
14
See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 4, at
1374–75.
15
See Widiss, Identifying Overrides, supra note 3, at
158 nn.72, 73 (discussing earlier studies showing
overrides of lower court decisions are common).
16
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 [“ADAAA”],
Pub. L. No. 110-325, §2(b), 133 Stat. 3553, 3554
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.)
(explicitly superseding aspects of the holding
and reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota Motor Manufg.,
Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)).
17
Id. § 2(b)(1).
18
See Widiss, Still Kickin’, supra note 3, at 930
(explaining research method).
19
See id. at 936–45.
20
See id. at 938–40. The cases in my dataset were
decided in 2013, 2014, and 2015; I reviewed the
facts in each to ensure they post-dated the effective date of the ADAAA, which was Jan. 1, 2009.
21
See id. at 942–45.
22
See id. at 937–38 (discussing relevant ethical
standards and case law).
23
See id. at 929.
24
See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No.
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95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k)), superseding Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
25
See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 3, at
551–56 (discussing this case law). Some recent
decisions have interpreted lactation to be directly addressed by the override’s language, as it
references medical conditions that are “related”
to pregnancy and childbirth. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Hous. Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2013).
26
See generally Widiss, Hydra Problem, supra note
3 (discussing this override and subsequent case
law development); the committee report is
quoted id. at 885–86.
27
See id.
28
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)
(holding different standard applied to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); see also
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 530 U.S. 338
(2013) (holding different standard governed Title
VII’s retaliation provision).
29
Compare, e.g., Woods v. START Treatment &
Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2017)
(holding that the standard articulated in Nassar
did not apply to a retaliation claim under the
Family and Medical Leave Act), with Sharp v.
Profitt, 674 F. App’x 440, 450–51 (6th Cir. 2016)
(holding it is “likely” that it does).
30
See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of African
American-Owned Media, et al., No. 18-1171
(considering what causation standard applies
to claims brought under 42 U.S.C § 1981); Babb v.
Wilkie, No. 18-882 (considering what causation
standard applies to claim brought under the federal-sector provisions of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act).
31
See Widiss, Hydra Problem, supra note 3, at 918–20
(collecting case law illustrating this problem).

32

Compare Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 914 F.3d
480, 485–87 (7th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (majority
op.), with id. at 499–503 (Hamilton, J., dissenting)
(disagreement regarding the significance that
Congress’s clarification of Title VII in accordance a prior judicial opinion should have on interpretation of the ADEA); see also Ethan J. Leib
& James J. Brudney, Legislative Underwrites, 103
Va. L. Rev. 1487 (2017) (discussing prevalence of
congressional amendments that “underwrite”
or codify prior judicial interpretations).
33
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 174–77 &
n.3 (2009).
34
See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 3, at
560–81; Widiss, Hydra Problem, supra note 3, at
926–42.
35
See, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (including congressional findings explicitly repudiating the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)).
36
See generally Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 4
(describing use of committee reports in identifying overrides); see also Leib & Brudney, supra note
32 (describing use of committee reports in identifying legislative “underwrites,” i.e., congressional
approval of prior judicial interpretations).
37
See supra note 14.
38
See Widiss, Identifying Overrides, supra note 3,
at 164–66 (discussing this issue more fully).
39
See, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009
(enacting an override that amends four different
employment discrimination laws, each of which
is codified separately).
40
See Widiss, Hydra Problem, supra note 3, at
920–26 (discussing this issue more fully).
41
See id. at 933–42.
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